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Farewell to Welfare:  
An End to Citizenship as We Know It
Alessandro Pinzani
The crisis of the welfare state has been a widely discussed topic since at least the 1970s both in the social 
sciences and in political debate. It is not my intention to readdress it or to analyze the many diagnoses 
of the meaning and scope of the crisis: there is a huge amount of literature on this and I do not aim to 
add another contribution. Rather I would like to investigate the reasons that led to the wide acceptance 
among the public in Western Europe (and probably elsewhere) of the dismantling of certain features of 
the welfare state. To this end, I shall focus on the discourses that justified this process and that have 
provided a major shift in the political vocabulary from the grammar of (social) rights to the grammar 
of performance and (state) services. In other words, I shall concentrate on the paradigm change from a 
Keynesian model of welfare state to a ‘neoliberal’ model of personal responsibility. This change of para-
digm threatens the very idea of citizenship as we have known it for centuries.
Welfare state and social rights
For long time social rights have been discussed around the categories devel-
oped by Thomas Marshall (1950). According to this author, civil, political and 
social rights were introduced in consecutive waves; one could talk, therefore, 
of three generations of rights. As a matter of fact, this was a twofold process: 
on the one hand, the scope of individual rights got wider (from civil to politi-
cal to social rights); on the other, more and more individuals became rights-
holders (this is particularly evident in the case of voting rights, which were 
first limited through censual criteria, then were extended to all male citizens 
and finally were granted to all citizens with no regard to gender).  Accord-
ing to Marshall and those who use his conceptual categories (e.g. Mezzadra 
2002, Baglioni 2009), it is precisely this extension of rights as a growing socio-
political inclusion that allows the identification of the essential nexus between 
rights and citizenship. The welfare state in all its concrete shapes (for it has 
many, as shown by Esping-Andersen 1990 among others) incarnates the prin-
ciple according to which citizenship is to be defined in terms of the fruition of 
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civil, political and social rights. The latter ones are then understood as those 
rights that grant to citizens the material conditions to concretely enjoy the 
others, i.e. as the guarantee that civic and political rights will not be granted 
only formally, but really enjoyed.
Of course, it is possible to see the existence of the welfare state, or even of 
social rights, in a completely different light, namely as a concession of public 
services by politicians who are interested in electoral consensus rather than in 
citizenship, or as the result of demands coming from specific interest groups 
(e.g. the working class). Not only writers opposing the welfare state, but also 
leftist authors have similar readings. For instance, in the 1970s Habermas 
claimed that a consequence of the welfare state was the transformation of 
citizens into clients, whose electoral behavior would be influenced or even 
determined by what political parties would promise with regard to public 
services (Habermas 1975)1. However, in almost every state the discourse that 
has been used until recently to justify welfare programs used the grammar 
of citizenship: the welfare state would represent the best way of guaranteeing 
those social rights, whose enjoyment is the necessary condition for enjoying 
all other rights and therefore for being a full-fledged citizen. In the last dec-
ades, this discourse has undergone significant changes and finally it has given 
way to a completely different one, which we may call ‘neoliberal’2, and which 
renounces completely to the notions of citizenship and of social rights. How 
did this happen?
If we were to put the 1970s debate on the welfare state into a wider histori-
cal and political context, we could claim that this debate was made necessary 
by a crisis, which was not only economical, but also ideological. During the 
trente glorieuses, i.e. the decades between 1945 and 1975, called also the «Gold-
en Age of Capitalism» (Hobsbawm 1994), Western industrialized societies 
experienced the establishment of a social and political compromise that had 
multiple causes, some of which went back to the 19th century: the struggles of 
workers’ movements and unions in Germany, to which Bismarck answered 
by creating an embryonic welfare state in order to avoid their radicalization; 
Black Friday and the crash of 1929, which revealed the frailty of a form of fi-
nancial capitalism that had no rules; the Great Depression of the 1930s, which 
saw a dreadful rise in poverty in countries that were thought to have reached 
a solid level of welfare; the public policies against this crisis, which were in-
1  Obviously Habermas did not aim at criticizing the welfare state, rather at transforming it so 
that this consequence might be avoided and citizens might decide according to less egoistic and 
parochial criteria.
2  The expression ‘neoliberal’ is placed within quotation marks because (as we shall see) it is far 
from obvious what neoliberalism is.
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spired by Keynes’ theory and saw massive state interventions; the war effort 
during both World Wars, which created in most countries something like a 
national unity beyond existing class interests; the social policies introduced 
by the British government as a consequence of the Beveridge report (1942)3; 
the rebuilding phase after WWII, which gave birth to a veritable European 
market; and probably also the fact that capitalists and conservative parties 
mistrusted the working class and feared that it could side with the Soviet bloc, 
so they considered it necessary to make concessions in order to guarantee its 
loyalty, just as Bismarck had done with the German workers.
The compromise led to the Europe-wide creation of the welfare state in 
its liberal, social conservative and social democratic forms (Esping-Andersen 
1990). But since the end of the 1960s and above all after the oil crisis of 1973 
and as a consequence of the economic crises, which haunted the main indus-
trialized countries in the first half of the 1970s with phenomena of inflation 
and even stagflation, something changed in the official discourse. The domi-
nant Keynesianism underwent a crisis itself and an alternative doctrine start-
ed becoming increasingly influential – a doctrine that later became known as 
neoliberalism.
The reluctant dismantling on the welfare state
According to a widespread interpretation, neoliberalism would be the main 
factor responsible for dismantling the welfare state. Usually two politicians 
are considered to be the bearers of the neoliberal standard and the initiators 
of this dismantlement: Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. However, 
while there is no denying that both got elected on the basis of programs that 
foresaw massive reductions in public spending, dramatic tax cuts and a radi-
cal scaling down of government action, neither of them actually maintained 
these promises, particularly with regard to the welfare state. As shown by var-
ious authors (e.g. Pierson 1996), both Thatcher and Reagan carefully avoided 
practicing what is labeled nowadays in Italy with the gruesome term ‘social 
butchering’. Some social programs were downsized (some of them even heav-
ily, like the allowance for single mothers), but generally speaking both the Iron 
Lady and the Cowboy President took care not to alienate potential electors 
minimized the cutting of the most popular social programs or of retirement 
benefits. When Thatcher tried to impose the extremely unpopular Commu-
3  Available at <http://www.sochealth.co.uk/national-health-service/public-health-and-well-
being/beveridge-report/>.
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nity Charge (known also as ‘poll tax’), the final result was her fall, promoted 
by her own party comrades, who feared losing the next election. 
For this reason, according to Pierson, cuts to social programs happen al-
most always in an indirect or in a hidden way, like in the case (mentioned by 
him) of the cuts that were decided in 1994 by Congress under a Republican 
majority and that were intended to only take place after 2000 - in order not to 
jeopardize the elections of 1996 and 1998. On the other hand, massive cuts to 
the welfare state have undeniably taken place in almost every industrialized 
country, at least after 1996 (the year Pierson published his analysis). Interest-
ingly, though, the most radical reforms, which led to a downsizing of social 
expenses and – above all – to a new way of conceiving the welfare state, have 
been undertaken by non conservative or even (nominally) leftist politicians 
such as Clinton, Blair or Schröder. With the aim of understanding how this 
was possible, I would like to analyze briefly the kind of discourse used to jus-
tify these reforms, also in order to grasp why this discourse was so successful 
among the electorate (even among leftist voters) and surprisingly also among 
the groups which would be more directly affected by the cuts. 
The neoliberal discourse on welfare
As we have seen, mistrust towards the welfare state was manifested also by 
authors who can be considered to be leftists, like Habermas. Even more radi-
cal was the skepticism of so-called neoliberal authors. Already in 1974, a 
few months after the oil crisis and the introduction of austerity policies in 
many European states, Samuel Brittan wrote a text that had a huge influence 
after its publication one year later. It is not by chance that the essay’s title 
was The Economic Contradictions of Democracy, since Brittan judges democracy 
exclusively from the point of view of its economic costs and of its efficiency 
deficit. Brittan highlights two problems, which according to him haunt all 
democratic regimes, since they are inherent to democracy itself, at least in 
its contemporary avatar of liberal representative democracy. The first prob-
lem is that democracy generates excessive expectations among citizens; the 
second is that within democratic regimes there is a tendency towards the rise 
of groups, which try to impose their particular interests with huge costs for 
the community. According to Brittan, both problems could be resumed by 
saying that «an excessive burden is placed on the ‘sharing out’ function of 
the government». This function includes all «activities of the public authori-
ties in influencing the allocation of resources, both through taxation and 
expenditure politics and through direct intervention in the market place» 
(Brittan 1975: 130).
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Following partially Schumpeter, Brittan conceives the democratic con-
test as an electoral market, in which politicians try to get elected by promis-
ing that they will use their power to distribute resources and public benefits 
among their voters, and in which voters choose their candidates according to 
these promises. «Unfortunately», writes Brittan, «neither promises of redis-
tribution from politicians nor demands for it from the electorate carry with 
them a knowledge of how much there is to redistribute, let alone a consensus 
on a just distribution» (Brittan 1975: 141). This mechanism for choosing rul-
ers leads unavoidably to the rise of interest groups, each one of which aims 
at obtaining from a government the most benefits possible. As a result, the 
government ends up making ad hoc concessions, which will never result in 
a coherent, rational politics, but which on the other hand despite their high 
costs and deriving inefficiency do not lead to catastrophic effects as, accord-
ing to Brittan, history would show. Brittan’s essays ends with some critiques 
of public bureaucracy inspired by Irving Kristol (the so-called ‘godfather’ of 
U.S. neo-conservatism) and with a section on the «mirage of social justice» 
that echoes arguments by Hayek, who is explicitly quoted.
Which arguments does Brittan introduce to sustain his claims concerning 
the two major problems of democracy? In the case of excessive demands, he 
takes up some remarks by Schumpeter on mass psychology, on the irrational-
ity of the masses and on their being easily manipulated. According to Brittan, 
when individuals are freed from their personal responsibility, they tend to leave 
aside any rational calculus and any critical caution. Furthermore, they do not 
have time to ‘lose’ by demanding political analysis, or with a detailed study 
of facts and different political programs, but they will choose their candidates 
more or less unthinkingly and irrationally. Moreover, since voters do not stand 
under budget constraints, they tend to expect from government and state much 
more than what public finances allow for. In other words, as soon as they dis-
miss their role as private individuals to slip into that of voters, citizens forget any 
prudence, since the costs of the policies they support do not weigh immediately 
on them, while the benefits do. As for the existence of interest groups competing 
for governmental resources, Brittan mentions a single example: workers’ un-
ions, which would care exclusively for guaranteeing benefits to their members, 
regardless of the costs and consequences for other groups and the state. 
Why is Brittan’s essay so interesting? Because it uses concepts and argu-
ments that in the following decades have been used by neoliberal authors 
and have penetrated so deeply into the political discourse that nowadays they 
appear trivialities or unquestionable truths. In the first place, we are pre-
sented with a definition of the average voter as a rational, calculating subject 
when it comes to making decisions in the private sphere, and as an irrational, 
thoughtless subject when it comes to public decisions. Furthermore, the di-
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chotomy public/private is used here to introduce the topic of the unaccount-
ability of those who manage public affairs – even voters are considered to 
be unaccountable in this sense – as well as the topic of the inefficiency of 
public bureaucracy, opposed to the efficiency of private enterprises. If one 
should schematize the concepts used by Brittan, one could distinguish two 
conceptual fields that are clearly opposed, the first is characterized positively, 
the second negatively: Private vs. Public; Accountability vs. Unaccountability; 
Responsibility vs. Irresponsibility; Rationality vs. Irrationality; Efficiency vs. 
Inefficiency. It is worth noting that all the concepts referring to the public 
sphere are connoted negatively, even from a semantic point of view, being 
characterized by negative prefixes.
Brittan does not give us empirical data to maintain the thesis according 
to which the private sphere is characterized by the above mentioned positive 
qualities – and he could hardly do this, since in the last decades empirical stud-
ies have actually put into question the idea of a rational subject not only in the 
political, but also in the economic field (Caplan 2007, Elster 1999, Green and 
Shapiro 1994); further studies show that even private enterprises have to cope 
with irrationality and inefficiency just as public bureaucracies do (e.g. Jackall 
1988)4. So, he just resorts to some remarks that oscillate between plain com-
mon sense and the ideology of homo oeconomicus, but have no scientific basis. 
The public/private dichotomy used by Brittan is typical of the attitude of 
strong mistrust towards politics, government and state, which characterizes 
neoliberal authors and the politicians who got their inspiration from their 
works (one has just to think of Reagan’s famous claim: «government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem»)5. We shall come back to 
this anti-governmental rhetoric: but for now, I would like to observe that the 
use of negative terms such as irrational, unaccountable, inefficient represents 
a form of delegitimizing state action and ultimately the democratic state itself. 
As for the thesis concerning interest groups, which in itself does not repre-
sent anything new (it is a topos of Republican literature from Cicero to Rous-
seau and Madison), it is worth noting that the only examples mentioned by 
Brittan are workers’ unions, as if there were no other lobbies and interest 
groups, e.g. employers’ associations. In his choice of this example, the ide-
ological nature of Brittan’s argument becomes evident: the only particular 
interests that supposedly give rise to problems of efficiency and economic ir-
responsibility are those of unionized workers, not those of employers or of 
4  One could also read the hearings of  the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, whose report 
is available at <http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report>.
5  In his first inaugural address on January 20th 1981.
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farmers who receive state subsidies, or of rich taxpayers who benefit from tax 
cuts. Probably Brittan would claim that subsidies and tax cuts are just a way 
to incentivize economic growth – at least this is what mainstream economists 
frequently claim6.
As I said before, the concepts and arguments used by Brittan have become 
part of the prevalent common sense, not only among political and economical 
scientists, but also in everyday political discourse. Of course, Brittan was not 
responsible for this (neither were Thatcher or Reagan), precisely as Keynesi-
anism’s triumph cannot be ascribed only to Keynes. Let us say that texts like 
Brittan’s essay are signs of a deep change both in political debate and prac-
tice. Although at certain points it just takes over ideas that had been already 
presented by Schumpeter, Hayek or Kristol, it is an extremely timely text – at 
least with regard to the time it was published. Those years were characterized 
by the crisis of Keynesianism and by the search for an alternative theory that 
might, first, help to make sense of the crises that were haunting capitalism 
and that might, second, offer solutions that could strengthen the capitalist 
economic system, particularly in a historical moment in which an alternative 
system seemed to exist, namely really existing socialism (we know now that it 
was actually an inefficient model, doomed to failure, but in the mid-1970s not 
everyone would have agreed on this). 
In this theoretical vacuum neoliberalism did step into the breach. It was 
not a fully fledged theory, rather a set of heterogeneous doctrines, which were 
partly inspired by classical liberalism, but differentiated themselves from it 
through the firm conviction that the best way to have (a) an economic system 
that was as efficient as possible and (b) a political system that could guarantee 
the highest amount of individual freedom would be to extend the model of the 
market also to spheres (such as education, health care and public services in 
general), which up to that moment had obeyed a different logic (e.g. those of 
citizenship or of social inclusion). Neoliberal ideas had already been formu-
lated, but were considered extravagant in the era that saw the dominance of 
Keynesianism7. They were kept alive by the Mount Pelerin Society, which 
comprised economists, but also politicians and publicists, and, when Keynesi-
anism was challenged by the 1970s crises, they found influential standard 
6  Just think of  the trickle-down theory, which is obsessively repeated despite the fact that empir-
ical data not only fail to confirm it, but tend to prove it wrong (the United Nation Development 
Program Reports since 2002 confirm every year a global tendency towards a wider inequality 
in the distribution of  wealth and income).
7  Hayek’s ideas were reportedly mocked by his colleagues at LSE. For a short history of  the 
rise of  neoliberalism among the difficulties presented by the dominance of  Keynesianism see 
Peck 2008.
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bearers in intellectuals like Milton Friedman, who managed to present them 
as the only viable alternative to Keynes’ ideas, if one wanted to save capital-
ism. In a few years they became the dominant ideas, also because they fitted 
perfectly with marginalism and neo-classical economics, i.e. with the eco-
nomic theories that were (and still are) taught in almost every business school. 
Thatcher and Reagan’s landslides marked the triumph of these ideas also 
among common voters, even if the corresponding policies were not immedi-
ately implemented (most likely out of fear of the possible negative reactions of 
the voters themselves, as Pierson claims).
The reasons for a triumph
What were the causes of this triumph? For, even if Brittan and Pierson are 
right in their analyses, it is far from clear why voters embraced so enthusiasti-
cally political proposals that promised cuts to public services and to welfare, 
and that therefore would reduce benefits and force the voters to diminish their 
demands on the state. The circumstances in which voters did repeatedly sup-
port governments that vowed to reduce public spending and public services 
seems to prove wrong both the hypothesis of irresponsible, egocentric vot-
ers (on which Brittan founded his analysis) and the hypothesis of calculating, 
maximizing voters (which is defended by Pierson and many others). 
Maybe the reason for this apparent paradox must be sought in the fact 
that neoliberals recur to a simple moral argument, actually so simple that it 
sounds often simplistic, but which is easily understood. The argument states 
that everyone is responsible for her own life and her socio-economic situation. 
A corollary to this argument claims that the state has no right at all to take 
taxpayers’ money (i.e. money earned through their hard work by “responsi-
ble” people) and redistribute it to people who prefer to live on benefits rather 
than working themselves. This extremely coarse version of two central intui-
tions of neoliberalism (the idea of individual responsibility and the thesis of 
the necessity of negative or positive incentives to promote individual initiative) 
has been defended by pundits in a great number of newspaper columns and 
TV debates, by authors of management and self-improvement handbooks, 
but also in books with academic ambitions published by conservative think 
tanks like the American Cato Institute. I shall quote as an example an ex-
cerpt from a book whose title is programmatic: A Life of One’s Own. Individual 
Rights and the Welfare State by David Kelley, published in 1998: «In our personal 
lives, most of us realize that the world doesn’t owe us a living. Whatever our 
individual circumstances, we know that we are responsible for doing what it 
takes to get the things we want in life. We’re responsible for earning a living 
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that provides for both current and future needs. We’re responsible, not just 
for doing our jobs day by day, but for finding a job in the first place and for 
acquiring the knowledge and skills it takes to find a job. […] Yet in our public 
lives we have accepted an obligation to provide food, shelter, jobs, education, 
pensions, medical care, child support, and other goods to every member of 
society. The premise of the welfare state […] is that the world does owe us a 
living».
From all this the author comes to the conclusion that the welfare state is 
undergoing a crisis that is not just financial (due to the explosion of its costs), 
but above all of a moral nature, since it assumes the existence of a non existing 
right and since it transforms individuals into parasites, instead of encouraging 
them to claim responsibility for their own lives. This is a very simple idea that 
presents the twofold advantage of letting taxpayers (Kelley’s target as readers) 
believe firmly that they are masters of their lives and at the same time feel that 
they are morally better individuals than the beneficiaries of social programs 
(the poor, the unemployed, single mothers etc.). They are therefore entitled 
to claim that the state reduce or abolish those programs without being ac-
cused of showing human coldness or a lack of solidarity. Kelley does not even 
try to justify his claim that «the world doesn’t owe us a living», as if it were 
something we all should grasp by ourselves soon or later – a self-evident truth 
affirmed in the face of every possible objection (Kelley is well aware that there 
are objections, as shown by his aside «whatever our individual circumstanc-
es», meaning that even if you are born in a Chicago slum by an unemployed 
single teen mother and have attended poorly funded schools, that were unable 
to give you a decent education, you are ultimately responsible for your own 
poverty). Once this premise has been postulated, the obvious consequence is 
that the welfare state lacks any moral legitimacy whatsoever.
Of course, Kelley’s readers have to accept this premise if they do not want 
to admit that after all, under certain individual circumstances, they also could 
need social programs; and above all they have to pretend never to have en-
joyed such programs, as if it were just the poor, the unemployed or the single 
mothers who receive public benefits because of their irresponsible actions. 
Paraphrasing a famous expression used by Eagleton with regard to ideology, 
irresponsibility is like bad breath: it is always the others who have it (Eagleton 
1991: 2). It is not by chance that the social programs that Reagan managed 
to reduce without too much difficulty were those concerning relatively small 
groups like single mothers, while he had to recur to legislative tricks in order 
to reduce the expenses for Medicare and Social Security without the voters 
noticing it immediately. 
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The end of welfare as we know it
On the other side, the US president who managed to implement significant 
cuts and to «end welfare as we know it»8 was Bill Clinton, who in 1996 (two 
years before the publication of Kelley’s book) signed the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA). This Act pursued goals, which 
clearly harmonized with neoliberal ideas, since it intended to put an end to 
welfare meant as a set of social programs grounded on individual social rights. 
In order to get access to the new programs, beneficiaries had to fulfill condi-
tions that went far beyond the ‘passive’ ones of lacking an income or a job. 
They were forced to accept any job after two years of permanence in the 
program; otherwise they would lose all benefits. Furthermore the program 
established a cumulative limit of five years for receiving federal benefits.
I would like to highlight two relevant aspects of the PRWORA. The first 
one is that it gives up the idea that citizens are entitled, viz. have an uncon-
ditioned right, to social programs. In the old model (welfare as we knew it), 
any needy citizen was entitled to certain benefits, even if it was up to the law 
to establish what it meant to be needy, in order to prevent abuses. In the new 
model (PRWORA), citizens (illegal migrants were explicitly excluded from 
social programs) get benefits that are conditioned by their own behavior. This 
leads to the second relevant aspect: what is expected from the beneficiaries 
of social programs is that they find a job which allows them to live autono-
mously; otherwise they will no longer qualify for receiving the benefit. They 
are expected to accept any kind of job, not necessarily a job well suited to their 
education and professional training. The result of the PRWORA was a sig-
nificant drop in the unemployment rate, to which, however, corresponded a 
sharp rise in low-wage jobs, more often than not forcing their holders to find a 
second job or face a life in dire straits9. In other words, «if any man would not 
work, neither should he eat», as the apostle Paul put it (2 Thessalonians, 3:10).
From welfare to workfare
We face therefore a paradigm change: from that of welfare to that of work-
fare, to recur to a term used by scholars (e.g. Peck 1998, Peck and Theodore 
2001), but also by politicians from the whole political spectrum, from Richard 
8  Speech at Georgetown University on October 23rd 1991; he repeated this sentence when he 
signed the PRWORA on August 22nd 1996.
9  An impressive description of  this kind of  life can be found in Ehrenreich 2001.
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Nixon (who used it as early as 1969) to Tony Blair (who in the 2000s imple-
mented welfare reforms similar to those introduced by Clinton). Actually this 
marks the return of policies that had already been implemented in Britain 
in the 19th century through the adoption of the New Poor Law (1834). This 
reform left the English poor facing three options: 1) those who were too old or 
sick to work were entitled to receive further public charity; 2) those who were 
able to work but had no job, would have be given food and lodging but had to 
work in the newly established workhouses (whose regime was more reminis-
cent of prisons than of factories); 3) those who were able to work, but had no 
intention of doing so, would be sent to prison or even deported. Many scholars 
have reconstructed the historical process that led to this veritable criminali-
zation of poverty (Geremek 1994, Himmelfarb 1984 and 1991, Somers and 
Block 2005); in this context I shall just discuss the discourse that was used to 
justify these measures, starting with Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population 
(1798; 2nd ed. 1803 [1992]), which introduced the argument that, contrarily 
to common opinion, the public policies of aid to the poor far from solving the 
problem of poverty make it worse10. 
According to Malthus, human beings are submitted to two laws of nature 
that are mutually conflicting. On the one hand they tend to reproduce lim-
itlessly, creating a situation of growing scarcity of resources. On the other, 
when they are not able to maintain their children, they stop reproducing, so 
that equilibrium between population and available resources is reestablished. 
Aid policies suspend de facto the second law, since they abolish the negative 
incentive not to have children (i.e. the perspective of the whole family ending 
up starving). Therefore the poor keep on reproducing, worsening their situ-
ation (more mouths to feed are born) and weighing more heavily on the state 
(the number of people to be helped by public charity increases). Therefore 
the solution to the problem of poverty consists in stopping helping the poor! 
Furthermore, Malthus claims, public assistance creates dependency and en-
courages the poor to live off state aids instead of incentivizing them to work 
and live autonomously. As one can see, we are faced with two different kinds 
of argument: a demographic one and a normative, moral one. Despite the 
alleged scientific nature of the first argument, Malthus thought it superfluous 
to offer data for his demographic thesis (data he did not have and could not 
possibly find, since the thesis has never been confirmed). He limited himself to 
appealing explicitly to logic and to common sense with no further empirical 
proof. The moral argument grounds on the premise that living off charity is 
10  This is a typical formulation of  what Hirschman calls «the perversity problem» (Hirschman 
1991).
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unacceptable, but Malthus does not explain why it is so: once again common 
sense is supposed to acknowledge the self-evidence of this principle. 
Malthus’ arguments were used to justify the introduction of the New Poor 
Law and were conjured up again in the 1980s by American thinkers in order 
to attack the welfare state. Such an author was Charles Murray, who in his 
best seller Losing Ground (1984) used Malthus’ arguments and even his method-
ology, claiming that «data are not essential to certain arguments about social 
policy and indeed can get in the way. The terms of debate can be grounded 
wholly in preferences about how the world ought to be, not how it is» (Murray 
1984: 53). Nevertheless Murray recurred to many anecdotal ‘proofs’ for his 
argument, like cases of so-called welfare queens, i.e. of single mothers who 
cynically exploited public benefits in order to live at the state’s expense (Rea-
gan too loved to quote such cases in his speeches). This argumentative line 
presents itself as being scientific and logical, but, in an absence of data that 
may confirm its conclusions (and in a rather unscientific way of proceeding), it 
recurs to moral principles that – it claims – are self-evident and need no fur-
ther proof. According to this line, welfare programs shape dependent, petty 
individuals who prefer to live as parasites instead of taking their own respon-
sibilities, finding jobs and supporting themselves autonomously. Therefore it 
is necessary, if not to abolish directly these programs, at least to reformulate 
them so that the beneficiaries be nudged to leave them and to rely only on 
themselves. In order to obtain this goal, incentives must be introduced – both 
positive (professional training, tax breaks for those who decide to start an 
independent enterprise etc.) and negative (those who do not look for a job or 
refuse one may lose their benefits). 
If we were to use Malthus and Murray’s methods and appeals to common 
sense instead of using empirical data, we should expect that in the end only 
negative incentives will be implemented, since they do not have any cost for 
the state (they even allow it to save money). But reality tells us another story. 
This can be explained with the fact that the above-mentioned welfare reforms 
do not aim primarily at reducing state costs but at establishing a principle: 
that of individual responsibility for one’s own socio-economic situation. Con-
trarily to what one could expect, once the reforms had been implemented, 
costs did not drop radically, but often increased because of the necessity of 
creating a much bigger bureaucratic apparatus than the one which managed 
the old welfare system. Examples of this are offered by the introduction of the 
so-called free schools in Britain and by the Hartz reforms in Germany. 
According to the current Tory government, free schools should have di-
minished education costs for the state, while at the same time establishing 
healthy competition among educational institutions; as a matter of fact, how-
ever, they have ended up receiving much more money from the state than 
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publicly funded schools, not to mention the necessity of creating a system of 
control and consultancy, which in some cases swallows up to 20 per cent of 
educational resources11. 
As for Germany’s Hartz reforms, this offers a very clear example of the 
‘pedagogical’ character of welfare reform and deserves some longer remarks. 
The left-wing coalition government of Social-Democratic Party and Green 
Party under Gerhard Schröder in 2002 realized a reform of the welfare state 
following the advice of a specific committee led by the former union leader 
(!) Peter Hartz. Also in this case we face a shift from the welfare to the work-
fare model. The two main forms of social assistance in existence up to then, 
namely the Arbeitslosenhilfe (unemployment allowance) and the Sozialhilfe (social 
allowance), were fused into a single program of social benefits. Positive and 
negative incentives were introduced, which actually represented conditions to 
be fulfilled in order to qualify for receiving the benefits. This is particularly 
clear in the case of individuals who have lost their job. While previously to 
the reform it was sufficient that they communicated the loss of their job to get 
their unemployment allowance (proportional to the contributions they had 
paid during their working time), now they have to show up for an interview 
with a personal consultant at the local Arbeitsamt ( job center), in order to be 
registered for the allowance12. 
The consultant (who has to follow dozens of cases) may command the un-
employed individual to undertake professional training, motivational semi-
nars etc. or to undergo medical or psychological examinations. Furthermore, 
the unemployed individual may be offered any kind of job, not only those 
for which she is qualified; she has the duty to appear at any job interviews 
provided by the consultant and if she fails to do so, the benefit may be cut. 
She has a residence duty and may not leave town without giving notice to the 
consultant. She has to be permanently available for contact and has 24 hours 
to react to a call from the job center (in the 2000s this implied forcing the 
unemployed to get an answer machine; nowadays with cell phones maintain-
ing contact is smoother). The bureaucratic apparatus necessary to manage 
the program and, above all, to control the beneficiaries (whose homes can 
also be inspected in order to ascertain the real level of indigence) is huge and 
the consequent costs have gone up over the years. Like in the USA, Germany 
saw a surge in low-wage and part-time jobs, which allow people to maintain 
their benefits but more often than not are insufficient to guarantee a decent 
11  See <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-and-expenditure-in-academies-in-
england-2013-to-2014> and <http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/aug/25/extra- 
funds-free-schools-warwick-mansell>.
12  Information on the program (in German) is available at <http://www.hartziv.org/>.
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life. Also in this case, the financial aspect was less relevant than the imposi-
tion of the principle according to which getting state aid is no longer a right. 
The state offers services to those who on their part give specific performances 
– in the first place by looking for a job, but also by participating in profes-
sional training or in other activities aiming at their reintroduction into the 
job market. In other words, the vocabulary of rights has been replaced by the 
vocabulary of individual responsibility, while the idea of unconditional rights 
has been replaced by the idea of state services conditioned by specific attitudes 
and behaviors on the part of the beneficiaries. The goal of this process is to 
attribute to the individuals the responsibility for their success or failure in 
finding a job. Public benefits are seen as a conditional aid, which individuals 
must prove themselves to deserve, not as the object of social rights. 
Personal responsibility and state control
This goal was clearly formulated in a document entitled Towards a Code of 
Social and Family Responsibility, which New Zealand’s government sent to all 
families in 199813. The document starts by listing some «disquieting aspects 
of New Zealand society». The first one is «a high and growing rate of de-
pendency on welfare benefits among working-age people. Over 19 percent 
of adults of working-age and 30 percent of children are dependent on in-
come from benefits», the document claims, without specifying the kind of 
benefits and, above all, without specifying whether the mentioned working-
age people are all jobless or if they have a job whose wage is so low that they 
have to rely on benefits to survive. In any case, the formulation gives the 
impression that these people prefer to live on subsidies rather than working. 
The second aspect is the «high level of families at risk». The risk here is not 
material poverty, as one could expect, but moral misery: «children of poor 
families appear to find unrewarding the traditional norms of hard work, 
creativity, diligence, organization, stability and loyalty». The third aspect is 
the «high levels of sole parenthood», which allegedly have «a negative effect 
on the educational attainment of children». The fourth aspect is a mixture 
of undesirable or unacceptable acts: «disturbing rates of child abuse and ne-
glect, births to teenage mothers and offending by young people» (apparently 
these phenomena are limited to the people who receive state benefits). The 
13 < https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/
archive/1998-towards-a-code-of-social-and-family-responsibility.pdf>. On this document see 
Larner 2000.
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fifth and last aspect concerns the «low levels of educational achievement 
of many children» (once again, this seems to be limited to the children of 
families who live on benefits). 
According to the commission that elaborated the document, families and 
individuals should assume more responsibility: «Governments [note the plu-
ral: it is about government in general, not about the present New Zealand’s 
government in particular – A. P.] should, first, step back to create space for 
a renewal of public but not political action; and, second, refrain from actions 
which undermine personal responsibility, the family and voluntary associa-
tions» (my italics). Social problems should be tackled by individuals and by 
institutions other than government. Individuals and voluntary associations 
are better suited than government when it comes to evaluating the real needs 
of persons and helping them to become independent and to develop a strong 
character. The state should cut its social programs and give space to private 
charity, according to the commission. Nevertheless, from the document one 
can infer that the state still has an important task, namely that of monitoring 
and when necessary punishing the individuals who do not comply with the 
new regime by assuming more personal responsibility. 
It could appear paradoxical that the government is asked to step back 
and make way for private initiative while at the same time it is expected that 
it take on the task of creating a control system, which did not exist previ-
ously. On the one hand less state is demanded, on the other more state is 
demanded. But the contradiction is only apparently as such. It exists only 
if one sees neoliberalism as an anti-state ideology and if one takes seriously 
Reagan’s quote on the government being the problem. In reality neoliberal-
ism is also a strategy for governing that aims not at reducing public expenses 
(under Reagan they reached significantly a record high) or the scope of 
governmental action, but at reformulating this action and at using extensive 
state power to impose the market logic and the morality of individual re-
sponsibility. Some authors mention two different phases of neoliberal devel-
opment: they speak of a roll-back and of a roll-out neoliberalism (e.g. Peck 
and Tickell 2002). The former is preoccupied with reducing governmental 
action to a minimum; the latter intends to use the state to pursue its own 
goals. Actually both dimensions have always gone hand in hand. At the mo-
ment the state abandoned a certain field to private initiative, it was forced 
to occupy a new one in order to practice its new controller role and to guar-
antee that citizens accept (willingly or not) the new regime. Examples of this 
are offered precisely by the transformation of welfare into workfare policies 
in Anglo-Saxon countries or in Germany.
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An end to citizenship as we know it
We can conclude that neoliberal theory and governmental practice limit 
themselves to insisting on some quite intuitive concepts: personal responsibil-
ity, individual merit, efficiency. Those who have afforded economic independ-
ency tend unavoidably to attribute to themselves the exclusive merit of this 
and, therefore, attribute to the poor or the unemployed the responsibility for 
their situation. These are two faces of the same coin: by blaming the poor for 
their poverty, these individuals are giving themselves the merit for their own 
wealth. As a consequence, they are no longer willing to accept that their mon-
ey, the money they earned through their hard work, be used to compensate 
for the laziness, incompetence or weakness of character of other people. It is 
not a matter of lack of solidarity; we face rather a system of values centered on 
the idea of individual responsibility, in which there is space also for solidarity, 
but only towards people who face a disadvantage without being responsible 
for it (e.g. the victims of natural catastrophes or of accidents they did not pro-
voke). It is not a right-wing or conservative system of values, since it has been 
adopted also by thinkers who define themselves as leftists such as the repre-
sentative of the so-called luck egalitarianism (e.g. Dworkin or G. A. Cohen). 
According to these thinkers, it is necessary to have social policies that correct 
disadvantages for which individuals cannot be blamed, but this does not apply 
to situations that are the result of individual bad choices (e.g. when a chain 
smoker faces the costs of curing lung cancer or when a mountain climber has 
to be saved from a ravine he fell into after having disobeyed warnings from 
officials and no entry signs).
Neoliberalism uses a language and moral arguments that are seductive 
for many people. Politicians who pursue policies that are (consciously or un-
consciously) inspired by its ideas tend to justify their welfare reforms by using 
precisely that language and those arguments. As a result, the debate on public 
services such as education or health care recurs less and less to the grammar 
of rights and prefers the grammar of efficiency and costs or of individual free-
dom (understood here merely as the freedom to choose among services that 
are no longer free, like in the case of school vouchers, which allow parents to 
pay for the school of their choice). Therefore, a discussion on the efficiency of 
the proposed reforms or on their efficacy in reducing costs is a wrong discus-
sion, since these reforms are implemented following moral principles more 
than economic considerations or efficiency criteria. In this sense, they are ide-
ological reforms in the wider sense of the term: they obey a specific worldview 
and specific moral values. The shift from welfare to workfare is the passage 
from one ideological model to another, from a view centered on the notions 
of rights and citizenship to a view centered on the notions of individual re-
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sponsibility and performances. In the latter view there is no place for a strong 
concept of political community: citizens are encouraged to see themselves as 
isolated individuals who demand specific services from the state, not as rights 
bearers who demand inclusion policies. Therefore, renouncing the grammar 
of (social) rights in favor of that of personal responsibility is not just a strat-
egy for justifying the dismantling of the welfare state, but represents a deep 
change in the understanding of what it means to be a citizen and of what the 
goals of a political community should be. 
The New Zealander ‘code’ represents an important step in this direction 
when it calls for the «renewal of public, but not of political action». At first 
glance, by distinguishing the political sphere from another sphere, which is not 
political and yet public, the text is just referring to the traditional separation of 
civil society and state. But it also claims that the ‘public, not political’ sphere 
(civil society) can manage social problems much better than the political sphere 
(the state), since such problems are actually individual problems connected to 
individual biographies, not political problems provoked by structural malad-
justments, inefficient educational policies, unequal distribution of wealth and 
income, lack of effective social programs aimed at children from poor families, 
etc. From this point of view, citizens cease to be holders of social rights and 
become mere individuals with personal problems. The state is no longer seen 
as the agent of possible change in their lives or as the guarantor of their rights, 
but as a watchman seeing that they comply with certain requirements that 
would allow them to qualify for services from institutions, which might be in-
differently state agencies, private companies or a mixture of both (as is increas-
ingly the case with private-public-partnerships). The state is no longer seen as 
a collective body of citizens who owe solidarity to each other, but as a service 
provider or as a watchman for private institutions, who become its ersatz. 
This vision is highly problematic. Despite Thatcher’s infamous quote ac-
cording to which «there is no such thing as society», but just individuals and 
families14, our life is shaped by institutions – may they be private or public. 
The most important of them is still the state and if the state ‘rolls back’ or 
‘steps back’, its place will be simply taken by other institutions, namely private 
institutions (not necessarily companies, but also churches, voluntary organi-
zations, NGOs etc.), over which citizens will have little control, if any. The 
rolling-back of the state and the privatization of public services represent a 
loss of democratic control for citizens, and therefore of freedom for individu-
als, as the repressive measures implicit in workfare clearly show, even if they 
14  Interview given on September 23rd 1987 to the magazine Woman’s Own (published on Octo-
ber 31st 1987, pp. 8–10).
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are defended by neoliberal authors and politicians precisely in the name of an 
alleged increase in freedom. 
When citizens give way to ‘costumers’ or to mere beneficiaries, individu-
als lose their power to control through political activity the institutions that 
shape their lives and therefore they lose the power to be masters of their lives. 
They start feeling like there really is no society; as a result they lose interest in 
political participation and probably solidarity with their co-citizens. In other 
words, ending welfare as we know it could mean an end to citizenship as we 
know it. It would be interesting to investigate how stable a society based on 
such values can be, and to ponder what its positive and negative aspects are, 
but this would go well beyond the scope of the present paper.
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